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Abstract
Recent research has documented that oil price changes lead the aggregate market
in most industrialized countries, and has argued that it represents an anomaly - an
underreaction to information that investors can profit from. I identify oil price
changes that are caused by exogenous events and show that it is only these oil price
changes that predict stock returns. The exogenous events usually correspond to
periods of extreme turmoil - either military conflicts in the Middle East or OPEC
collapses. Given the source of the predictability, I question its usefulness as a trading
strategy and its representation as an anomaly.
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1 Introduction
The predictability of asset returns is a controversial topic in financial economics. Ac-
cording to the Efficient Markets Hypothesis, all information in investors’ information sets
should be incorporated into asset prices, thus leaving asset returns unpredictable. How-
ever, researchers and practitioners have identified a number of variables that seem to
predict returns, at least in-sample. Some examples of variables that have been shown
to predict aggregate market returns are inflation (Fama and Schwert, 1977), the default
spread and the term premium (Fama and French, 1989) and the dividend-price ratio (e.g.
Campbell and Shiller, 1988; Fama and French, 1988). Other financial ratios, such as
the book-to-market ratio (e.g. Kothari and Shanken, 1997) and the earnings ratio (e.g.
Lamont, 1998) have also been shown to predict returns. Recently, other variables that
are not price-based have also been found to predict the aggregate stock market, such as
the investment to capital ratio (Cochrane, 1991), the consumption, wealth, income ratio
(cay) (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001), and the output gap (Cooper and Priestley, 2008).
Traditionally, these variables have been thought to capture time-varying risk premia, a
concept which is not in conflict with a modern interpretation of informationally efficient
markets. In addition, there is a growing literature that abandons the idea of informational
efficiency; this literature argues that behavioral biases induce stock return predictability.
In one recent example, Baker and Wurgler (2007) argue that investor sentiment predicts
returns. Another recent example is Hong, Torous, and Valkanov (2007) who find that
certain industries lead the aggregate market; they argue that this is due to underreaction
to information.
In this paper I examine how changes in the oil price affect stock markets. Oil is
by far the most important commodity, and as of September 2008 energy accounted for
around 75% of the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index (S&P GSCI), in which individual
commodities are weighted by their respective world production quantities. Crude oil
accounted for 40% of the entire index and Brent crude oil for another 15%, thus giving oil
products a weight of around 55% of the entire commodity index. Given its large weight, it
is not surprising that changes in oil prices may be an important factor behind fluctuations
in the economy. In fact, some of the largest fluctuations in the U.S. economy have been
preceded by political events in the Middle East that reduced the oil supply from this
region. For instance from 1973 to 1975 the oil price doubled, and oil importing countries
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experienced both inflation and rising unemployment. The later oil price increases during
the Iranian revolution and leading up to the Iran-Iraq war also caused stagflation. Turmoil
in the oil market has also had positive effects on the U.S. economy; following the OPEC
collapse in 1985 and 1986 the aggregate supply curve for oil was shifted to the right, oil
prices fell dramatically, output grew, unemployment fell and inflation was low. Given their
importance for the macroeconomy, it is also plausible that oil price changes are important
in explaining changes in stock prices, either through discount rate or cash flow effects.
In two interesting recent articles, Pollet (2004) and Driesprong, Jacobsen, and Maat
(2008) document that oil price changes predict stock returns. Driesprong et al. (2008)
use linear predictive regressions to show that lagged oil price changes strongly predict
returns, particularly in developed markets. They provide a number of arguments for why
the predictability does not represent time-varying discount rates, and argue instead that
it represents an underreaction to information, consistent with the story in Hong and Stein
(1999). They conclude that the statistical predictability stemming from lagged oil price
changes represents an anomaly that investors can profitably exploit.
The interpretation of the oil price predictability as an anomaly requires that it rep-
resents a stable relation between lagged oil price changes and subsequent stock returns
that investors can identify ex ante, trade on and make risk-adjusted excess returns. Since
the early 1970s the oil price has responded sharply to geopolitical events, particularly in
the Middle East. I examine whether these events have contributed to the statistical pre-
dictability in a significant way and evaluate the predictability according to the criteria set
forth in Goyal and Welch (2008). They write that the signal from a predictive regression
could give an investor confidence in the signal if it showed (i) good in-sample (IS) and
reasonable out-of-sample (OOS) performance over the sample period, (ii) an upward drift
in both IS and OOS plots, and (iii) an upward drift not only in special periods (such as
the outbreak of a war etc.).1 I am particularly interested in the third point above as,
historically, many of the most dramatic oil price movements have corresponded to mili-
tary conflicts in the Middle East and OPEC crises. According to the advice from Goyal
and Welch, an investor should not feel confident in the signal from the predictor if these
military conflicts and times of crisis are the only periods with good predictability.
In order to assess the IS and OOS performance of lagged oil price changes as a predic-
tor, I use the graphical diagnostic developed in Goyal and Welch (2003, 2008). The graphs
1The plots are explained in Section 4.
2
reveal that oil price changes seemingly predict well both IS and OOS.2 However, a closer
inspection of the graphs suggests that most of the predictability is driven by a few very
significant events. This casts doubt on the oil strategy’s virtue as an equity investment
strategy. I construct a counterfactual scenario where I remove a few historic events that
led to large oil price changes. This significantly weakens the predictability, particularly
OOS. In subsequent sections I reinforce and formalize the graphical evidence by consid-
ering nonlinear transformations of the oil price changes. I build on the ideas in Hamilton
(2003) and try to isolate an exogenous component of oil price changes that is attributable
to supply shocks or fear of supply disruptions. Exogeneity here refers to oil price changes
that are not caused by global or U.S. macroeconomic conditions, but rather are caused
by events that are exogenous with respect to the macroeconomy, such as political events
in the Middle East. These measures, constructed to pick out oil price changes that arise
because of exogenous events, are henceforth labeled exogenous oil price changes. I demon-
strate that it is only the exogenous component that forecasts returns. Furthermore, the
effect is asymmetric; large decreases in the oil price predict higher returns whereas large
increases predict low returns only for a few countries. This asymmetric effect disappears
once the oil price change is scaled by its time-varying volatility.
This paper illuminates the sources of the predictability of stock returns using lagged oil
price changes as the predictor. Since most of the predictability is associated with wars and
other extreme events, and since it disappears when the frequency is lowered to quarterly
or annual, I argue that the predictability represents neither time-varying discount rates
nor an anomaly. Rather, it is due to a few very significant extreme events that investors
arguably could not have confidently profited from. A plausible counterfactual scenario
removes much of the predictability, and non-linear transformations removes it completely,
thus highlighting the importance of extreme events for the statistical forecastability. My
conclusion is therefore different from Driesprong et al. (2008): I do not consider the
statistical predictability as evidence of an anomaly, nor do I recommend a trading strategy
based on the oil signal.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 performs the
initial linear regressions. Section 4 analyzes when oil price changes perform well as a linear
predictor and when they do not, both IS and OOS. Section 5 performs regressions using
2This is in contrast to most of the predictors examined in Goyal and Welch (2008), which have
performed poorly since the oil shocks in 1973.
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nonlinear transformations of the oil price changes as the predictor. Section 6 concludes.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 The oil price
Throughout the analysis I use the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) price of crude oil as
my measure of the oil price since it is often used as a benchmark in oil pricing and is
also used as the underlying commodity price for the New York Mercantile Exchange’s
(NYMEX) oil futures contracts. Many studies that exclusively focus on the U.S. use
the producer price index (PPI) for crude oil. However, since I consider both U.S. and
international stock returns it seems less appropriate and furthermore, as noted by Mork
(1989), it may be misleading during the price controls of the 1970s. The real price of crude
oil is obtained by deflating the nominal WTI crude price with the U.S. consumer price
index (CPI). Fig. 1 shows the nominal and the real WTI price of crude oil. The oil price
was approximately constant from 1960 to 1973 when it rose sharply as a consequence of
the Yom Kippur War and the oil embargo. I therefore start the sample in 1973:01 as this
seems to be the first point in time when investors could reasonably a relation between
oil prices, the real economy and the stock markets. The vertical bars in the graph mark
important events in the oil market. As is evident from the graph, many of these events
triggered huge changes in the oil price. The important oil events fall into two categories;
they are either military conflicts in the Middle East or events concerning the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). I shall focus on some of these episodes
later in the paper and, therefore, briefly explain below the most important of the episodes
that are marked with a vertical bar in Fig. 1.
2.1.1 Oil supply shocks
In the subsequent analysis I treat an oil supply shock as exogenous with respect to the
world economy, as has been common in the previous literature; for instance, the exogeneity
of the oil price collapse in 1985-1986 was an important element in the analysis in Lamont
(1997). A key question regarding each of these oil event dates is whether or not the event
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was unexpected. Arguably, they all contained elements of surprise, except perhaps the
second Gulf war. The month of the events listed below and also in Fig. 1 is the month
with the largest crude oil production disruption for the nation or group of nations most
directly affected by the event.
The Yom Kippur war (October 1973) was fought from October 6 to October 26, 1973
between Israel and a coalition of Arab states. In response to the U.S. decision to support
Israel during the war, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)
announced an oil embargo on October 15. As seen in Fig. 1, these events in 1973 resulted
in large upward jumps in the oil price. After the military conflicts in 1973 the volatility
of the oil price increased permanently from its pre 1973 low level. The Iranian revolution
(November 1978) started early in 1978 and culminated when the Shah fled Iran in January
1979 and the monarchy was replaced by an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Khomeini.
Real crude oil prices nearly doubled from the outbreak of the Iranian revolution to the
Iran-Iraq war. The Iran-Iraq war (October 1980) lasted from September 1980 to August
1988 and October 1980 saw the highest real price of oil over the sample, matched only
by the year-end 2007 price. The OPEC collapse (January 1986) marked the first large
decrease in oil prices over the sample period. Saudi Arabia, which had the swing-producer
role in OPEC and had bore most of the production cuts, abandoned its swing-producer
role in late 1985 and aggressively increased its market share. In response, other OPEC
members followed and the market was flooded with oil. The result was a sharp fall in oil
prices in the end of 1985 and beginning of 1986. The Persian Gulf war (August 1990)
started in August 1990 and ended in February 1991. The outbreak of the war resulted in
a sharp upward spike in oil prices and an equally sharp decline shortly thereafter. The
last three events in the graph did not cause such dramatic movements in the oil price.
The OPEC meeting in 1999 marked a low point for the oil price before it again started
rising; after the terrorist attacks in 2001, oil prices first declined but then rose sharply; the
outbreak of the second gulf war started an upward trend in crude oil prices that persisted
until year-end 2007.
2.1.2 Oil demand shocks
Oil demand shocks mainly describe increases or decreases in global demand for crude oil.
The exceptional growth in China and India has resulted in large recent demand increases
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for crude oil. It is believed that demand from these two economies is responsible for much
of the recent increase in oil prices. Oil price increases stemming from demand shocks have
two effects. On the one hand, increased global aggregate demand represents a stimulus
to the economy. On the other hand, the increased oil price may dampen that effect in
oil-importing economies due to e.g. the increased cost of energy. It is not clear which of
these two effects will dominate.
2.2 Equity data
The main part of the analysis is carried out using the MSCI equity indexes from 1973
to 2007; all equity indexes are monthly total return indexes. I do not have industry
level data available for the MSCI indexes, so for the industry level breakdown, I use the
Datastream industry indexes. The countries I consider are the G7 countries, Norway and
the World market. Norway has been included because it is the only major oil exporter for
which equity data is available over the entire sample period. Therefore, it is likely that
the Norwegian market will respond in a different way to oil price changes than the major
oil importing countries. I find that this is indeed the case. The Datastream indexes are
available from 1973, except for Norway, for which Datastream index returns are available
from 1980.
2.3 Interest rates and CPI data
I use the 3-month T-bill as the risk-free rate when computing the equity premium in all
countries. For Norway, I have joined the 3-month bill with a 2-year government bond
based on linear regressions because of a lack of data for the 3-month bill. I use the 3-
month bill rate for the U.S. to compute excess returns for the World market. Similarly,
U.S. inflation is used to compute real World returns. Alternatively, bill rate and CPI
baskets could have been constructed to obtain a World risk-free rate and inflation rate.
However, the empirical analysis suggests that these assumptions are fairly innocuous as
the results are similar for real and nominal, and actual and excess returns. Interest rates
and CPI data are downloaded from Global Financial Data.
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2.4 Descriptive statistics
The upper panel of Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for both real log oil price changes
and real MSCI equity returns. The real oil price is the most volatile of the time series with
an annual volatility of 28.61% during the sample period. Norway has the highest mean
real return over the sample, which may be caused by the large discoveries of oil on the
Norwegian continental shelf. The first oil was extracted from the Norwegian continental
shelf in 1971. Norway thus discovered the oil just in time to partake in the tumultuous
years following the OPEC price increases in 1973-1974 and again later in 1979-1980.
The mean returns, mean returns in excess of the 90-day T-bill, the standard deviation
of returns and the median are reported in annual terms. The min and max values are
the min and max of a particular month and have not been annualized. The rightmost
column reports the Jarque-Bera statistic for normality. The null hypothesis of normality
is rejected at all conventional significance levels for all the series. The critical value at the
5% level is 5.83.
3 Predictive regressions assuming a linear relation
In this section I extend the results in Driesprong et al. (2008) by considering real actual
returns and returns in excess of the risk-free rate, in addition to nominal actual returns.
The sample period is also extended from ending in 2003 to ending in 2007. I start by
estimating univariate predictive regressions for all G7 countries, Norway and the World
market with a linear specification of the form
rt+1 = α + βxt + εt+1, (1)
where r is a log return and the right-hand side includes lagged values of oil price changes.
Much of the literature on predictability has focused on the case where the explanatory
variable follows a persistent AR(1) process which has close to a unit root. This causes
problems with respect to inference and the possibility of spurious results as discussed in
Stambaugh (1999). However, in our case, the change in the log oil price is used as the
independent variable and from Table 1 the first order autocorrelation of changes in the log
real oil price is 0.17, which is far from a unit root. Therefore, we need not be concerned
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about unit root induced biases or non-stationarity of the regressor.
I report the t-statistics both under strict OLS assumptions and corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation (HAC) using the Newey and West (1987) procedure.3
Following Newey and West I include autocovariances up to five lags in the monthly sample
running from 1973:01 to 2007:12.4 Table 2 reports the results for the univariate regressions
in three cases. Panel A considers nominal and real log returns as measured in local cur-
rency. Panel B reports the results in local currency for excess rather than actual returns.
Table 2 shows that changes in the oil price has strong predictive power for both nominal
and real returns and for both actual and excess returns. Nominal oil price changes fore-
cast nominal actual and excess returns in six out of the nine markets considered. Real
oil price changes forecast real actual returns in seven and excess returns in six markets.
Unreported results show that nominal increases in the oil price lead to statistically sig-
nificant increases in inflation in all countries in the sample except Italy. This effect is not
surprising and is partly mechanical through the energy component of the CPI. This helps
explain why the negative relation between lagged oil price changes and stock returns is
amplified when considering real rather than nominal variables. It is not clear whether the
effect of oil price changes on international stock returns will be greater or smaller if these
stock returns are hedged into U.S. dollars. To assess the currency effect, I compute actual
real and nominal international stock returns in U.S. dollars according to the formula
rusdt+1 = ln
[(
1 +Rlocalt+1
)
/
(
1 +Rfxt+1
)]
, (2)
where rusdt+1 is the real or nominal log return measured in U.S. dollars, R
local is the real
or nominal return on the equity index measured in the local currency and Rfx is the
return on the local currency versus U.S. dollars. Excess log returns are unaffected by the
currency conversion as the currency returns cancel. There is a negative albeit statistically
insignificant relation between oil price changes and exchange rate depreciation versus U.S.
dollars for the countries in the sample, i.e. currencies have tended to weaken versus the
dollar following an oil price increase. Panel C in Table 2 shows that the predictability is
marginally weaker when both oil price changes and stock returns are measured in U.S.
dollars. This is consistent with the observed exchange rate movements mentioned above.
3The White heteroskedasticity consistent estimator and the Hansen-Hodrick estimator both give sim-
ilar results for the asymptotic covariance matrix of the coefficients.
4The lag length q is set to q = floor
(
4 (T/100)
2/9
)
, where T is the number of observations. The floor
function maps its argument to the nearest integer that is less than or equal to the argument.
8
In the remainder I focus on stock returns measured in local currency. The coefficient on
oil is negative in all markets and significant at the 5% level in all markets except Canada,
Japan and Norway. It is interesting to note that oil price has no predictive power in
Norway, which is the only country in the sample which is a major net oil exporter with
a full history of equity returns over the sample. It is also of interest to note that the
predictability is weak in Canada as well, a major oil producer albeit not a net oil exporter,
and the country that exports the largest amount of crude oil to the U.S. The results in
Table 2 suggest that lagged oil price changes strongly predict returns in six out of the
nine markets considered. However, one has to bear in mind that these nine markets are
not independent. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the correlations between the real
actual returns below the diagonal. Covariances of the real actual returns are reported on
and above the diagonal. Since the same regressor is used across all markets, we would
expect returns in two highly correlated countries to be either both forecasted or both not
forecasted by oil price changes.
Table 3 examines the predictability evidence further by using industry level data.
Since I have no industry level data available for the MSCI indexes, I use the Datastream
ICB industry indexes instead.5 Not all returns series are available in all markets; series
that are not available have been marked with a dash in the table. The two rightmost
columns report the number of significant t-statistics by industry across countries and the
total number of countries for which the time series were available. The two bottom rows
report the number of significant t-statistics by country and again the total number of time
series available per country. In the top panel, oil price changes are lagged one period; in
the bottom panel, the oil price changes are contemporaneous. An interesting observation
in the top panel is that to a large degree the same industries are forecasted by oil price
changes across countries. I confirm the finding in Driesprong et al. (2008) that the one
industry that is least predicted by oil is the oil and gas industry. Driesprong et al. (2008)
interpret this as an underreaction to information or gradual diffusion of information as
in Hong and Stein (1999). According to this theory, the oil and gas industry is not
predicted by oil price changes because oil has a first order effect in this industry. Hence,
information pertaining to the oil price is incorporated into prices without a lag. In other
industries, where oil has an important, yet more second-order effect, it may take time
for the information to be incorporated fully into prices. However, a challenge to this
5The ICB industries are Oil and Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Health Care,
Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials and Technology.
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theory seems to be that the ICB supersector Automobiles is strongly forecasted in all
markets where it is available.6 This would contradict the claim that information about oil
is quickly incorporated into industries where energy prices have a first-order effect. The
automobiles industry is one of the industries that is most sensitive to petroleum prices.
Stock returns can be decomposed into the sum of risk-free rates and excess returns.
The ability of the oil price to forecast returns is not due to its ability to forecast interest
rates. First, as shown in Table 2 lagged oil price changes forecast both actual and excess
returns. Second, unreported results show that when using real returns, lagged oil price
changes forecasts interest rate changes only in Italy and marginally in Norway. To address
causality further, Table 4 reports p-values from F-tests of Granger causality for various
lags using excess returns and real oil price changes. Stock returns do not Granger cause
oil price changes in any of the countries. Oil price changes Granger cause stock returns in
the same countries as in Table 2 at lags 1 and 6. At 12 lags France and the World market
become insignificant at the 5% level. In short, oil price changes lead stock returns, but
there appears to be no feedback from the stock markets to the oil price.
The economic significance of oil price shocks as measured in the predictive regressions
is large. The standard deviation for real oil price changes is 8.26% per month (28.61% an-
nualized). The beta coefficient on lagged oil for real actual returns is −0.11. This implies
that a one standard deviation increase in the oil price leads to a drop in fitted returns in
the U.S. of −0.91% per month, corresponding to an annualized return of −10.90%.
3.1 Robustness tests
The previous section shows that oil price changes lead stock returns and that this relation
has been both statistically and economically significant. However, the importance of this
finding would be diminished if the predictive ability of oil price changes were subsumed
by other predictors used in the extant literature. This section assesses how robust the
findings from the univariate regressions are by including several known predictors. The
dividend-price ratio, measured as the moving sum of the last 12 months of dividends
6Unreported evidence shows that the t-statistic on lagged oil price changes is significant in France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, U.S. and World. The Automobiles industry is not available for the full
sample in Canada and Norway.
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divided by price, has been shown to have predictive power for returns by Campbell and
Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988) among others. The short rate has been shown
to be a strong forecasting variable by for example Ang and Bekaert (2007). The term
spread, measured as the difference between the 10-year government bond rate and the
3-month T-bill rate has been used to predict returns by e.g. Fama and French (1989).
Inflation has been shown to predict returns by Fama and Schwert (1977). I also control for
possible autocorrelation in returns by including the lagged equity premium. The results
from these robustness tests are reported in Table 5. Interestingly, all countries that
recorded a statistically significant coefficient on lagged oil price changes in the univariate
regression, as reported in Table 2, continue to do so. The coefficient on oil price changes
is significant in more countries than any of the other predictors that have been used in the
extant literature. The statistical forecasting power of oil price changes is not subsumed
by the other predictors.
It is also important to examine what happens to the predictability when changing the
horizon over which stock returns and oil price changes are measured. There are several
ways to change the frequency; I consider what happens both when I use overlapping and
when I use non-overlapping returns. The non-overlapping results are straightforward.
They are obtained by summing log returns and log oil price changes over a horizon, never
using the same observation more than once, and then performing the regressions. Thus,
the sample shrinks from T to T/h, where T is the number of months used in the estimation
and h is the number of months over which returns are aggregated. The overlapping log
excess returns from time t− h to t are computed as
ret−h→t =
h∑
i=0
ret−i. (3)
This procedure induces serial correlation since the same lagged returns are included several
times. To try to account for the serial correlation I correct the standard errors of the
coefficient estimates using the Newey and West (1987) procedure with 2(h− 1) lags. The
vector of oil price changes is left unchanged so the regression results using overlapping
observations are computed by estimating
ret−h→t = α + βxt−h + εt+1. (4)
Table 7 reproduces Panel B of Table 2 but with quarterly and annual frequencies in-
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stead of monthly. The statistical significance disappears completely when considering
non-overlapping returns but is mostly retained when considering overlapping returns, es-
pecially at the quarterly frequency. This could be explained by the historical tendency
of a reversion following some of the largest oil price changes. Therefore, when using
non-overlapping observations over a longer horizon the monthly movements in both oil
prices and stock returns have canceled out. However, the overlapping procedure is con-
structed in such a way that these intermediate movements are not fully washed away.
The evidence in Table 7 suggests that the predictability of equity premiums by oil price
changes is mostly a short-horizon phenomenon. This is important evidence against the
oil predictability describing time-varying expected returns, but is consistent with a slow
reaction to information story, as suggested by Driesprong et al. (2008).
4 Out-of-sample evidence of predictability
The IS predictability in the previous section seems impressive. In this section I try to
scrutinize the predictability results to find out when and why oil price changes predict
returns. I examine both IS and OOS predictability using a newly developed graphical
tool suggested by Goyal and Welch (2003, 2008). The graphs represent a diagnostic tool
to assess when the prediction from the univariate OLS model outperforms a random walk
model. Hence, two models are considered: under the null hypothesis, the prediction for
the equity premium at any point in time is just the prevailing mean, i.e.
E
(pm)
t
[
ret+1
]
=
1
t
t∑
i=1
rei . (5)
Under the alternative hypothesis, the equity premium is predicted by a regressor xt = ∆ot,
which is the change in the log oil price from t-1 to t. The regression equation is
ret+1 = α + βxt + ε
(x)
t+1. (6)
Superscript (x) means that a variable belongs to the OLS model and (pm) means that
a variable belongs to the prevailing mean model. To emphasize the recursive procedure
used for the OOS forecasts, I use time subscripts on the estimated coefficients to denote
the information included in their estimation. The prediction for the equity premium in
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period t+1, using only information available at time t, is then
E
(x)
t
[
ret+1
]
= αˆt + βˆtxt. (7)
This approach uses an ”expanding window” where parameters are estimated recursively
with data from the first data point in the sample up to the time of the forecast to
generate one-step ahead forecasts. Note that only information up to time t is included in
the recursive estimates of the parameters. Therefore, in the OOS models we get updated
parameter estimates at each time point that is included in the estimation period. I use 20
time periods before I start estimating the model. The IS period before I start forecasting
is thus 1973:03-1974:10 and I compute OOS forecasts from 1974:11 to 2007:12. Figure 2
shows the time-varying regression coefficient on lagged oil for the U.S. stock market. In
the top panel I have plotted the important oil dates as grey bars; in the bottom panel I
have plotted the NBER recession dates as grey bars. The width of the bar corresponds
to the period when the economy went from peak to trough. The beta coefficient for the
U.S. settles fairly quickly to a stable level after the turmoil in 1973. Figure 3 shows the
beta coefficients on lagged oil for the remaining countries in the study. The evidence is
now more mixed and in some countries the coefficient on lagged oil seems unstable. In
particular it seems the OPEC collapse in 1985-1986 had an important, albeit differential,
impact on the beta coefficient. In Italy the coefficient went from positive to negative over
the course of the OPEC collapse.
The squared forecast errors in each period for the two models are
SE(pm) (t) =
(
ret − E(pm)t−1 [ret ]
)2
(8)
SE(x) (t) =
(
ret − E(x)t−1 [ret ]
)2
. (9)
Subtracting Eq. (9) from Eq. (8) gives a measure of how much better the OLS model
predicted than the prevailing mean model in a given period. At each point in time τ , the
cumulative OOS sum of squared errors is measured as
Net-SSE(τ) =
τ∑
t=1
SE(pm) (t)− SE(x) (t) , (10)
where SE(pm) is the squared OOS prediction error in year t when the prevailing mean is
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used as the forecast of the next return and SE(x) is the squared OOS prediction error when
the oil price change is used as the predictor of the next return. If the graph is upward
sloping, the equity premium is better predicted by lagged oil price changes than by a
random walk. Whenever the graph decreases, the OLS model cannot predict better than
the prevailing mean. The IS coefficient estimates correspond to using the entire sample
period in the estimate. This is equal to the last OOS coefficient estimates since we have
used the entire history in the sample to compute the coefficients. The IS forecast errors
are obtained using the entire sample under consideration.
The procedure described above entertains a different null hypothesis than the one used
in Tables 2 and 3. In order to assess the OOS statistical significance of the alternative
OLS model versus the prevailing mean, different tests must be performed. The MSE-F
test developed by McCracken (2007) tests the null hypothesis that the prevailing mean
model has a mean-squared error (MSE) that is less than or equal to the MSE of the OLS
model. This statistic is given as
MSE-F = P · MSE
(pm) −MSE(x)
MSE(x)
, (11)
where P is the number of one-step ahead forecasts and MSE(pm) and MSE(x) are the
mean-squared errors from the prevailing mean and OLS model respectively.7 I also report
the Clark and McCracken (2001) encompassing statistic, where the null hypothesis is that
the restricted model encompasses the unrestricted model and is given by
ENC-NEW = P ·
∑T
t=R
[
ε
(x)
t+1
]2
− ε(x)t+1ε(pm)t+1∑T
t=R
[
ε
(pm)
t+1
]2 , (12)
where R denotes the number of IS observations used before forecasts are made and ε(x)
and ε(pm) are the residuals from the forecasting models. Goodness of fit is measured by
IS and OOS R2 estimates (not adjusted for degrees of freedom here). This statistic is
computed as
R2 = 1−
(
1− MSE
(x)
MSE(pm)
)
. (13)
7All OOS statistics described in this section are estimated with a recursive scheme that uses more
data as the forecasting moves forward in time.
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Table 6 reports the OOS statistics discussed above. The first column displays the IS R2
for comparison; these are identical to the ones in Table 2 Panel B using real returns.
Figure 4 graphs the IS and OOS performance of the predictive regression for the U.S.
Again I have split the figure into two panels. The top panel plots the important oil dates
as grey bars; the bottom panel plots the NBER recession dates as grey bars. Note that
a minimum number of data points is needed before we can start predicting the equity
premium out of sample; I have chosen 20 initial data points. Therefore, we can predict
IS before OOS and hence the dotted (IS) line starts before the solid (OOS) line. I have
constructed the graphs such that they are both zero when the OOS forecast period starts.
This means that if the OLS model has predicted better than the random walk for the
initial 20 data points, the dotted line is constructed to start below zero.
Figure 4 reveals some noteworthy facts about the ability of lagged oil price changes to
explain asset returns. It appears that the predictability comes from a few episodes only.
Even more interesting is the fact that these episodes correspond almost exactly to what I
labeled oil supply shocks above. It is in the periods identified as either military conflicts or
OPEC crises that the predictability emerges. Three periods stand out in particular: the
Yom Kippur war, The OPEC collapse and the first Gulf war. In the U.S. the predictability
is strongest around July 1990 and the subsequent months. If we look at the second panel
of Fig. 4 we see that this period corresponds to the peak of the business cycle as defined
by NBER. It therefore appears that oil price changes predicted the recession. However,
it may be just as plausible that the U.S. equity market plummeted for reasons other than
oil price changes in this period.8
Figure 5 shows the graphs for the remaining countries in the study. Consistent with
the results in Table 2, the predictability is weak in Canada and Japan and non-existent in
Norway. The difference between the IS and OOS results is largest for the countries where
oil price changes do not predict the equity premium. This indicates a more unstable
relation between oil and asset prices in those markets. In the remaining countries, oil
strongly forecasts returns. From the graphs in Fig. 5 we see that they share a common
feature with the U.S. results: the exogenous oil shocks result in periods of remarkable
predictability, in particular the episodes in 1973, 1985-1986 and 1990.
8Mankiw (2003) writes that this recession was caused by ”several contractionary shocks to aggregate
demand: tight monetary policy, the savings-and-loan crisis, and a fall in consumer confidence coinciding
with the Gulf War”.
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4.1 Predictability under a counterfactual scenario
Based on the results in Figs. 4 and 5, I consider what happens when I remove some of
the dates which represent what I have identified as exogenous shocks. Consider a matrix
of observations Z where each row consists of a vector
z′t+1 = [rt+1,∆ot] .
When removing certain dates from the sample, I remove a row z′t. This means that when
I remove an exogenous oil event that has caused a dramatic change in the oil price, I
also remove the subsequent reaction in the stock market. I remove the oil dates 1973:10-
1973:11, 1978:10-1979:01, 1980:10, 1986:01-1986:08, 1990:07-1991:02 and 2003:02-2003:04,
i.e. a total of 26 out of 419 z′t+1 entries in the Z. Removing the oil dates results in a
significant drop in the predictability. Only three out of nine equity premia, Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom, remain significantly predictable from oil price changes IS
after removing these dates (the table has been omitted for brevity). This illustrates that
much of the predictability comes from these extreme events. Figure 6 shows the IS and
OOS graphs for the countries where oil price changes were significant predictors prior
to the removal of dates. The graphs show an increased discrepancy between the IS and
OOS predictability after having removed the oil dates. The weaker OOS results mean
that under the counterfactual scenario that the military and political events discussed in
Section 2 did not take place, an equity investor following the oil signal would significantly
underperform compared to a random walk strategy in France, the U.S. and World. In
fact, the investor would never have been ahead of the random walk benchmark in these
three markets, except for a brief period in France. In the remaining three markets with
previous strong predictability results, the investor would still be slightly ahead of the
random walk benchmark as of year-end 2007. However, had the sample ended earlier, the
random walk strategy would have outperformed the OLS model in these three cases as
well.
16
5 Functional form in the predictive regressions
This section supports and formalizes the graphical evidence in Section 4, that predictabil-
ity is largely driven by a few significant events. There exists a large literature that
examines the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks in the U.S., with a particular
emphasis on the effects on growth and inflation, see e.g. Barsky and Kilian (2004) and
Hamilton (2008) for a review. The positive effects on the economy following the oil price
decrease after the OPEC collapse in 1985 and 1986 were not of the same magnitude as the
adverse effects following the large oil price increases in the 1970s. This led Mork (1989)
to consider a nonlinear specification in which only oil price increases impact the economy.
Elaborating on these ideas, Hamilton (2003) further examines the functional form for oil
and the macroeconomy. However, no consensus has been reached regarding the effects
oil price changes have on the stock markets. The analysis in Section 3 was conducted
with a linear specification, as in Driesprong et al. (2008). Such a specification predicts a
symmetric response from oil price increases and decreases. In this section, I show that
a linear specification seems inappropriate. Instead, I examine nonlinear specifications,
some of which have been suggested in the macroeconomics literature (see e.g. Hamilton,
2003). The examination of functional forms is another means of identifying and isolating
the events that cause the statistical predictability. If the true functional form is nonlin-
ear, then inference based on a linear regression can be biased. For brevity I focus on the
log equity premium and the real change in log oil prices. I assume that the predictive
regression is of the form
rt+1 = f (∆ot) + εt+1, (14)
where the function f may represent a nonlinear relation. Even though I consider nonlinear
transformations of the oil price, the transformations are still linear in the parameters.
Hence they can be described as linear regressions of the form
rt+1 = α + β
′x˜t + εt+1, (15)
for a corresponding specification of the regressor x˜t.
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5.1 Positive and negative oil price changes
I start by examining a nonlinear transformation first suggested by Mork (1989). In par-
ticular, I examine the separate effects of oil price increases and oil price decreases as many
papers in the macroeconomics literature have suggested that oil price increases affect the
economy adversely, whereas oil price decreases do not affect the economy positively, at
least not to a similar extent. The measure proposed by Mork (1989) to correct the relation
between oil prices and GDP is
∆o+t =
{
∆ot , ∆ot > 0
0 , ∆ot ≤ 0
. (16)
Hamilton (2003) addresses the question of functional form in the case of the oil price
and GDP and finds that the estimated effects of oil price increases are larger than those
implied by the linear relation. However, it is not clear that this applies to the equity
markets. First, stock market data are available at much higher frequencies than macro
data, which are typically quarterly. Second, in an informationally efficient market, all
available information should be incorporated into prices. Therefore, a priori, it may be
just as likely that the markets react positively to an oil price decrease. I therefore also
consider the negative equivalent
∆o−t =
{
∆ot , ∆ot < 0
0 , ∆ot ≥ 0
. (17)
Table 8 shows that the results for stock return predictability are quite the opposite of
what has been found in the macroeconomics literature for the oil and GDP relation. It is
the oil price decreases, not the increases, that predict stock returns more strongly.
5.2 Extreme changes in the oil price over a horizon
The oil market since 1973 has been characterized by extreme price fluctuations corre-
sponding to important geopolitical events, as illustrated in Fig. 1. I therefore examine
whether these extreme events have had a particular influence on the predictability of
stock returns using lagged oil price changes. Hamilton (2003) proposes a measure which
is targeted at gauging the effects of these exogenous oil price shocks on GDP. He compares
18
today’s oil price against the maximum oil price attained over a prespecified horizon. The
measure of the oil shock is the amount by which the log oil price exceeds its maximum
value over a previous period, e.g. one year or three years. If oil prices are lower than they
have been at some point over this previous period, no oil shock is said to have occurred.
The idea is that it is the large oil price changes that affect the economy adversely and
especially if they come unexpectedly. Hamilton’s measure, often referred to as the net oil
price increase, is
∆o†,+t =
{
ln
(
ot/o
max
t−1
)
, ot > o
max
t−1
0 , ot ≤ omaxt−1
, (18)
where the max oil price is defined as
omaxt−1 = max {ot−1, . . . , ot−k} , (19)
and k is the prespecified horizon. As in the above case, there is no reason to consider
only the effects of positive oil price changes on stock prices. I therefore construct a
corresponding measure that is non-zero if it is lower than the minimum oil price over the
same prespecified horizon. The corresponding negative measure is
∆o†,−t =
{
ln
(
ot/o
min
t−1
)
, ot < o
min
t−1
0 , ot ≥ omint−1
, (20)
where omint−1 is defined as in Eq. (19) with the min operator instead of the max. Figure 7
plots the oil price measures described in Eqs. (18) and (20). The figure shows that the
minimum and maximum transformations to a large extent pick out the oil price changes
that are caused by exogenous events and set the oil price changes not caused by these
events to zero. I also define a third measure that considers extreme oil price changes,
whether they be positive or negative
∆o†,±t =

ln
(
ot/o
max
t−1
)
, ot > o
max
t−1
0 , omint−1 ≤ ot ≤ omaxt−1
ln
(
ot/o
min
t−1
)
, ot < o
min
t−1
. (21)
The results from regressions using the three measures above as the explanatory variables
are reported in Table 9. The top panel considers minimum and maximum returns over a
period of 12 months whereas the lower panel sets the horizon to 36 months. Compared
to the results in Table 8, the predictability from positive oil price changes are almost
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non-existent. Only two out of nine countries are predicted by ∆o†,+t when k = 12 and
three markets when k = 36. Again, the predictability is strongest for the negative oil price
changes; Norwegian equity returns are the only ones that are not predicted by ∆o†,−t . The
forecasting ability of ∆o†,±t is also strong; returns in six of the countries have significant
t-statistics when k = 12 and seven when k = 36. This is in sharp contrast to what
Hamilton (2003) finds for the oil and GDP relation; this relation only becomes significant
when considering the maximum measure.
I now define measures that truncate the extreme oil price changes, as captured by the
max oil price increases and decreases, to zero. I define these as the log change in the real
oil price when the exogenous measures ∆o†,+t , ∆o
†,−
t and ∆o
†,±
t above are zero. The one
corresponding to the maximum is thus
∆o˜†,+t =
{
0 , ot > o
max
t−1
∆ot , ot ≤ omaxt−1
, (22)
the one corresponding to the minimum is
∆o˜†,−t =
{
0 , ot < o
min
t−1
∆ot , ot ≥ omint−1
, (23)
and the one corresponding to both extremes is
∆o˜†,±t =

0 , ot > o
max
t−1
∆ot , o
min
t−1 ≤ ot ≤ omaxt−1
0 , ot < o
min
t−1
. (24)
The results from estimating the predictive regressions using these measures are reported
in Table 10. Arguably, the measures ∆o†,+t , ∆o
†,−
t and ∆o
†,±
t extract the exogenous
component of the oil price changes, whereas the measures ∆o˜†,+t , ∆o˜
†,−
t and ∆o˜
†,±
t remove
the most extreme changes that are due to geopolitical influences. Together, Tables 9
and 10 then establish a very interesting fact: the asset return predictability comes from
the exogenous changes in oil prices. Once these have been truncated to zero, the remaining
part has no power to forecast returns. This again illustrates that an oil-based equity
trading strategy entails no riskless profits. An investor would have to be very confident
that an upheaval in the oil market would result in a stock market reaction that went in
the right direction. Since there are so few of these significant events, and each event had
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its own special characteristics, such confidence would perhaps be unwarranted.
Driesprong et al. (2008) report that their results are robust to exclusion of the most
extreme five percent of oil price changes. Unreported results, obtained by trimming
the data at different percentiles, confirm their finding for the extended sample period
ending in 2007. Compared to Table 2, the coefficient point estimates are similar, but
less precisely estimated, so the t-statistics are somewhat lower. However, Table 10 shows
that truncating the extreme oil price changes to zero according to Eq. (24) removes
the predictability in all markets when the horizon is set to 12 months, and only the
Italian equity premium has a significant t-statistic when the horizon is 36 months. Hence,
trimming the data and truncating extreme values has different effects. The extensions of
Hamilton’s net oil price measure represent quantitative dummy variables corresponding
to rare shocks. They capture the empirical observation that oil price shocks that occur in
an otherwise calm environment have a stronger impact on stock returns than those that
occur in a volatile environment.
5.3 Oil price changes scaled by GARCH volatility
Another transformation has been suggested by Lee, Ni, and Ratti (1995) who argue that
”an oil shock is likely to have greater impact in an environment where oil prices have been
stable than in an environment where oil price movement has been frequent and erratic”.
They control for this by scaling the oil price by the conditional volatility as measured
by a GARCH model. The effect of the Lee et al. (1995) transformation is that a small
shock that occurs in a calm period will be scaled up whereas a large shock in a volatile
period will be scaled down. Lee et al. (1995) use quarterly data and include four quarters
in the conditional mean equation. I use monthly data so in order to be consistent with
their measure I include 12 lags in the conditional mean equation. Thus, I compute a
GARCH(1,1) model based on the following conditional mean equation
∆ot = φ0 +
12∑
i=1
φi∆ot−i + at, (25)
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and conditional variance equation
at = σtεt, εt ∼ NID (0, 1) (26)
σ2t = α0 + α1a
2
t−1 + β1σ
2
t−1. (27)
The volatility-adjusted oil price increase is then given by9
∆o‡t = ∆ot/σt. (28)
The aforementioned authors add another nonlinear transformation to this measure. They
set the volatility adjusted measure equal to zero if the oil price decreased. This trans-
formation effectively reduces the impact of oil price changes if they occur in a volatile
environment and increase the effects in quiet markets. As before I also examine what
happens when I use the positive and negative parts only
∆o‡,+t = max
{
∆o‡t , 0
}
(29)
∆o‡,−t = min
{
∆o‡t , 0
}
. (30)
I estimate the GARCH(1,1) model using oil price data starting in 1946:01.
Table 11 shows the results when forecasts are made using the volatility adjusted oil
price changes. The surprising result is that the asymmetry between positive and negative
changes has disappeared. The same six countries are predicted by each of the three
volatility adjusted measures. Unreported IS and OOS graphs show that the predictability
comes from exactly the exogenous episodes identified previously and hence renders also
this an undesirable predictor for an investment strategy.
5.4 Tests for asymmetry
The results presented thus far suggest that the functional form for the forecasting regres-
sion is both asymmetric and non-linear. However, Tables 8 to 11 do not provide formal
statistical tests of non-linearity and asymmetry of the slope coefficients. One way to
9Lee et al. (1995) use at/σt as their measure instead of ∆ot/σt. I use the latter for compatibility with
the rest of the results in the paper.
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test for the presence of non-linearity is to estimate a regression equation which includes
linear symmetric oil price changes and a censored regressor as an additional explanatory
variable. The regression equation is then
rt+1 = α + β1xt + β2x˜t + εt+1, (31)
where x denotes the log change in the oil price and x˜ denotes the censored regressor. Panel
A of Table 12 reports the p-values corresponding to the Wald tests of the null hypothesis
that β2 is zero, where x˜ is given as the extreme measures as outlined in Eqs. (18), (20)
and (21), and the scaled measures as in Eqs. (28) to (30) respectively. The table shows
that the presence of non-linearity is best captured by the extreme oil price decreases
given by Eq. (20). As discussed above, this surprising result is in contrast to the effect on
macroeconomic variables. There appears to be strong non-linear effects in France, Italy,
Japan and for the World market. In contrast, the scaled oil price measures are mostly
insignificant when included as additional regressors.
The test for equality of the parameter estimates is conducted by running the regression
rt+1 = α + β1x˜
+
t + β2x˜
−
t + εt+1, (32)
where the explanatory variables are the censored positive and negative values of the
linear, extreme and scaled measures. I have computed the robust Wald statistics using
GMM estimators corrected with the Newey and West (1987) procedure. In the current
setting, this is equivalent to testing the significance of the t-statistic on the censored
explanatory variable. Panel B shows that the asymmetric effect is particularly strong in
Italy; asymmetric effects measured as measured with Eq. (32) are also present for Canada,
France and the World market.
6 Conclusion
The extant literature on the predictability of the equity premium usually explains statis-
tical forecastability either as time-varying discount rates or as an anomaly. Driesprong
et al. (2008) argue that the predictability stemming from lagged oil price changes repre-
sents an anomaly: ”the predictability of stock market returns based on oil price changes
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does qualify as truly anomalous as it cannot be attributed to time-varying risk premia”.
They conclude that the results point in the direction of a true market inefficiency. This
paper argues that the statistical forecastability of international equity premiums repre-
sents neither time-varying discount rates nor an anomaly. I have shown that most of the
predictive power of changes in oil prices comes from distinct episodes in the oil market.
These episodes are predominantly military conflicts in the Middle East and OPEC crises.
This means that investors should not be too confident in an equity trading strategy based
on signals from the oil market. A question of interest is whether it is the oil price changes
or the events associated with the military conflicts that affect the economy. Two ques-
tions then arise. First, why do oil price changes lead equity returns? Second, the OPEC
collapse in 1985-1986 is not associated with a military conflict. Hence, the predictability
arising from this episode is oil-specific.
This paper includes data from 1973 through 2007. The financial crisis of 2008 has seen
dramatic movements both in the equity indexes that I consider and in the oil price; in
fact the oil price has constantly been in the financial news in 2008 because of its extreme
rise and fall during the year. The predictability from oil price changes has weakened
considerably during the financial crisis as plummeting oil prices were followed by abysmal
stock returns, thus disobeying the estimated negative relation between the two quantities.
This most recent OOS evidence again illustrates the risks involved in following an oil-based
investment strategy, and the fragility of the oil and stock returns relation.
I show that there is a strong statistical predictability arising mainly from a few im-
portant events, and that this statistical forecastability is not subsumed by other known
predictors. Other rational predictors are unlikely to explain returns arising from these
extreme events, and will consequently perform poorly as predictors in those periods. As
such, accounting for the oil shocks by controlling for the major oil price movements may
prove valuable when assessing the performance of various predictors in future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The top panel shows descriptive statistics for log real oil price changes and log real returns for the G7 countries, Norway, and the World market.
The bottom panel shows correlations below the diagonal and covariances on and above the diagonal for the log real returns on the MSCI country
indices. Column three is the log mean equity premium over the period. The rest of the statistics in the table are for the actual real log returns,
not the excess returns. The means, standard deviations and medians have been annualized. The covariances are quoted in basis points. The
sample period is 1973 to 2007.
Mean Mean Excess St. Dev. Median Min Max Skew Kurt AC(1) AC(2) JB
Oil 4.89 3.67 28.61 -0.32 -34.98 36.31 0.20 6.89 0.17 -0.05 267
Canada 5.52 3.02 17.15 8.24 -24.67 15.03 -0.77 6.05 0.04 -0.05 205
France 6.80 4.42 20.63 14.66 -24.86 19.93 -0.41 4.37 0.09 -0.02 45
Germany 6.54 4.44 19.83 10.13 -28.58 19.30 -0.86 6.33 0.05 0.02 246
Italy 3.75 1.77 23.75 4.30 -20.99 23.72 0.10 3.84 0.06 0.01 13
Japan 2.42 2.10 17.97 5.87 -22.60 18.38 -0.26 4.35 0.07 0.05 37
Norway 6.89 4.40 25.34 15.72 -35.33 22.52 -0.63 4.99 0.14 -0.06 97
U.K. 5.87 3.62 19.64 11.33 -30.50 40.83 0.10 11.47 0.09 -0.09 1,255
U.S. 5.55 4.33 15.47 8.74 -24.12 15.39 -0.57 5.48 0.02 -0.02 131
World 4.61 3.39 13.92 8.62 -22.04 12.79 -0.90 6.08 0.09 0.01 223
Stock return correlations and covariances
Canada France Germany Italy Japan Norway U.K. U.S. World
Canada 24.50 16.00 12.62 12.67 9.21 19.70 16.11 16.43 15.11
France 0.54 35.46 22.58 22.03 11.62 22.99 19.60 15.51 16.65
Germany 0.45 0.66 32.76 18.91 10.49 19.35 15.82 13.84 15.20
Italy 0.37 0.54 0.48 47.01 12.76 18.00 16.61 10.95 14.09
Japan 0.36 0.38 0.35 0.36 27.00 9.86 9.96 8.64 13.40
Norway 0.54 0.53 0.46 0.36 0.26 53.50 19.48 17.09 16.93
U.K. 0.57 0.58 0.49 0.43 0.34 0.47 32.14 16.00 16.47
U.S. 0.74 0.58 0.54 0.36 0.37 0.52 0.63 19.95 16.33
World 0.76 0.70 0.66 0.51 0.64 0.58 0.72 0.91 16.14
Table 2: Predictive regressions for the G7 countries, Norway and the World market
The table shows the beta coefficient between lagged log oil price changes and stock returns, the corre-
sponding t-statistic under strict OLS assumptions, the GMM-corrected t-statistic using Newey and West
(1987) and the R2. Panel A shows the results for the actual log nominal and real returns. Panel B shows
the results for the log nominal and real excess returns. The log nominal and real excess equity returns
are identical. Hence, the only difference between the results in Panel B is that the left panel uses nominal
oil returns whereas the right panel uses real oil returns. Panel C shows the results when the international
stock returns have been hedged into U.S. dollars. The sample period is 1973 to 2007.
Nominal Real
b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%)
Panel A: Log returns in local currency
Canada -0.03 -1.19 -1.33 0.34 -0.04 -1.37 -1.51 0.45
France -0.13 -3.82 -3.31 3.39 -0.14 -4.08 -3.49 3.85
Germany -0.15 -4.52 -4.34 4.68 -0.16 -4.75 -4.48 5.15
Italy -0.21 -5.29 -4.39 6.31 -0.21 -5.38 -4.54 6.51
Japan -0.06 -1.92 -1.84 0.88 -0.07 -2.28 -2.13 1.24
Norway -0.02 -0.49 -0.44 0.06 -0.02 -0.57 -0.50 0.08
U.K. -0.12 -3.65 -4.69 3.11 -0.13 -3.97 -4.80 3.65
U.S. -0.10 -3.73 -4.27 3.24 -0.11 -4.22 -4.77 4.11
World -0.09 -4.12 -4.40 3.91 -0.11 -4.64 -4.87 4.92
Panel B: Log excess returns in local currency
Canada -0.03 -1.14 -1.27 0.31 -0.03 -1.03 -1.13 0.25
France -0.13 -3.79 -3.27 3.34 -0.13 -3.72 -3.18 3.22
Germany -0.15 -4.51 -4.30 4.66 -0.15 -4.43 -4.20 4.50
Italy -0.20 -5.17 -4.31 6.04 -0.20 -5.09 -4.23 5.86
Japan -0.06 -1.92 -1.85 0.88 -0.06 -1.82 -1.74 0.79
Norway -0.02 -0.42 -0.38 0.04 -0.02 -0.36 -0.33 0.03
U.K. -0.12 -3.67 -4.64 3.14 -0.12 -3.61 -4.54 3.04
U.S. -0.10 -3.74 -4.26 3.26 -0.09 -3.65 -4.09 3.11
World -0.09 -4.13 -4.39 3.93 -0.09 -4.01 -4.20 3.72
Panel C: Log returns in USD
Canada -0.03 -0.82 -0.88 0.16 -0.03 -0.96 -1.03 0.22
France -0.12 -3.25 -2.40 2.48 -0.13 -3.46 -2.54 2.80
Germany -0.14 -4.07 -3.41 3.84 -0.15 -4.27 -3.52 4.20
Italy -0.20 -4.84 -3.41 5.34 -0.21 -4.88 -3.47 5.42
Japan -0.03 -0.93 -0.70 0.21 -0.05 -1.21 -0.90 0.35
Norway -0.02 -0.34 -0.36 0.03 -0.02 -0.42 -0.43 0.04
U.K. -0.11 -2.88 -3.28 1.95 -0.11 -3.15 -3.52 2.33
U.S. -0.10 -3.73 -4.27 3.24 -0.11 -4.22 -4.77 4.11
World -0.09 -3.65 -3.54 3.10 -0.10 -4.14 -3.95 3.95
Table 3: Significance in predictive regressions by industry and country
The table shows the t-statistic for the regression coefficient on nominal oil price changes when using the Newey and West (1987) procedure
to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In the top panel, oil price changes are lagged one period; in the bottom panel, oil price
changes are contemporaneous. The table also displays the number of significant industries and the total number of industries for which there
exists a full set of observations in each market. t-statistics are marked in bold. In this table, the stock returns are the nominal Datastream
indices as I do not have industry data for the MSCI indices available. The sample period is 1973 to 2007, except for Norway where the sample
starts in 1980.
Canada France Germany Italy Japan Norway U.K. U.S. World Sign. Tot.
Returns regressed on lagged change in oil prices
Total Market -1.93 -3.22 -4.39 -4.26 -1.79 -0.39 -4.60 -4.17 -3.29 6 9
Oil and Gas 0.03 -1.24 - - -0.31 0.75 -2.71 -1.18 -1.39 1 7
Basic Materials -2.10 -2.79 -3.22 -3.93 -1.18 -2.20 -2.72 -2.20 -1.90 7 9
Industrials -2.07 -3.01 -3.31 -3.39 -2.42 -0.89 -3.65 -3.44 -3.06 8 9
Consumer Goods - -2.87 -3.62 -4.38 -2.48 - -3.24 -3.66 -2.81 7 7
Health Care -2.52 -2.15 -3.52 - -0.82 - -3.30 -2.86 -2.65 6 7
Consumer Services -3.57 -3.42 -3.45 -2.78 -2.08 -0.44 -4.43 -4.28 -3.83 8 9
Telecommunications - - -3.71 -5.54 0.00 - - -2.49 -2.17 4 5
Utilities -0.75 - -3.73 -3.36 -0.97 -0.53 - -0.91 -1.41 2 7
Financials -1.69 -3.19 -3.59 -3.70 -0.42 0.31 -3.85 -2.93 -2.29 6 9
Technology -1.24 -3.17 - - -2.93 - -3.23 -3.57 -3.96 5 6
Significant 4 8 9 8 4 1 9 9 8 60 84
Total 9 9 9 8 11 7 9 11 11 84 -
Returns regressed on contemporaneous change in oil prices
Total Market 1.46 -1.18 -1.03 -0.29 -0.05 3.07 -1.29 -1.71 -0.75 1 9
Oil and Gas 4.54 4.09 - - 0.44 6.76 3.43 4.00 3.71 6 7
Basic Materials -0.16 -0.97 -1.23 0.12 -0.32 1.18 -0.49 -1.59 -0.49 0 9
Industrials -0.13 -1.12 -0.74 -0.25 0.63 -0.13 -0.87 -1.70 -0.48 0 9
Consumer Goods - -1.95 -1.30 -1.23 0.60 - -1.00 -3.04 -0.81 1 7
Health Care -0.68 -3.15 -1.61 - -0.60 - -3.94 -3.92 -3.11 4 7
Consumer Services -1.57 -1.58 -1.96 0.34 -0.63 0.39 -1.54 -3.41 -1.86 2 9
Telecommunications - - -0.34 -1.73 0.55 - - -1.31 -0.55 0 5
Utilities -0.23 - -1.24 0.32 -2.86 -0.63 - -1.43 -2.10 2 7
Financials -1.79 -2.46 -1.16 -0.19 -0.43 -0.26 -2.48 -3.40 -1.70 3 9
Technology -0.40 -1.16 - - 1.13 - 0.71 -0.47 0.04 0 6
Significant 1 3 1 0 1 2 3 5 3 19 84
Total 9 9 9 8 11 7 9 11 11 84 -
Table 4: Granger causality between stock returns and oil price changes
The table shows the p-values of F-tests of bivariate Granger causality using the number of lags specified
in the header. The null hypothesis is that the variable on the right side of the arrow does not enter the
reduced form equation for the variable on the left side of the arrow. The instances where one variable
Granger causes the other at the 5% level are in bold. The sample period is 1973 to 2007.
1 lag 6 lags 12 lags
∆o
G9 r r G9 ∆o ∆o G9 r r G9 ∆o ∆o G9 r r G9 ∆o
Canada 0.27 0.39 0.82 0.23 0.95 0.86
France 0.00 0.97 0.02 0.85 0.24 0.74
Germany 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.26 0.09 0.53
Italy 0.00 0.93 0.00 0.94 0.01 0.55
Japan 0.07 0.78 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.59
Norway 0.45 0.36 0.35 0.15 0.52 0.30
U.K. 0.00 0.93 0.01 0.86 0.02 0.95
U.S. 0.00 0.20 0.02 0.29 0.03 0.84
World 0.00 0.57 0.01 0.51 0.06 0.78
Table 5: Robustness tests of the predictability
The table tests whether the predictability of equity premiums by lagged changes in the oil price is robust
to the inclusion of forecasting variables that have been used in the extant literature. The columns report
the least squares estimates, t-statistics (in parentheses), and adjusted R2. The standard errors used in
the computation of the t-statistics are GMM-corrected using Newey and West (1987). The predictors of
the equity premium are all lagged one period and include the oil price change, equity premium, dividend-
price ratio, first difference in 3-month T-bill rate, inflation, and term premium. The sample period is
1973 to 2007. *Significant at 10% level. **Significant at 5% level.
∆o re DP ∆rf ∆CPI TERM R
2
(%)
Canada -0.03 0.03 0.16 -0.10 -0.63 1.36 0.30
(-1.23) (0.59) (0.56) (-1.86)* (-0.94) (0.56)
France -0.12 0.07 0.04 0.03 -0.25 3.62 2.76
(-3.02)** (1.34) (0.21) (0.45) (-0.26) (1.17)
Germany -0.14 0.03 0.16 -0.08 -0.62 1.52 3.60
(-3.76)** (0.52) (0.55) (-0.89) (-0.75) (0.48)
Italy -0.20 0.05 0.19 0.01 -0.51 3.01 5.45
(-4.21)** (1.23) (0.63) (0.20) (-0.73) (1.06)
Japan -0.05 0.06 0.69 0.10 -0.73 0.60 0.76
(-1.58) (1.05) (1.51) (0.73) (-1.83)* (0.13)
Norway -0.02 0.14 0.57 0.00 -1.05 3.74 2.16
(-0.50) (2.63)** (1.83)* (-0.18) (-1.35) (1.81)*
U.K. -0.10 0.09 1.05 -0.05 -1.44 -1.62 6.53
(-3.71)** (1.39) (2.14)** (-0.92) (-3.21)** (-1.15)
U.S. -0.08 -0.03 0.29 -0.16 -1.71 0.30 6.02
(-3.31)** (-0.55) (1.56) (-2.41)** (-2.89)** (0.14)
World -0.08 0.04 0.42 -0.13 -1.99 -0.51 7.35
(-3.50)** (0.70) (2.00)** (-2.92)** (-3.54)** (-0.26)
Table 6: OOS predictability tests
The table shows in-sample (R2IS) and out-of-sample (R
2
OOS) goodness of fit measures. In addition, the
MSE-F statistic from McCracken (2007) and the encompassing statistic from Clark and McCracken (2001)
are reported. The sample period is 1973 to 2007. ***Significant at 1% level.
R2IS(%) R
2
OOS(%) MSE-F ENC-NEW
Canada 0.25 -0.31 -0.98 0.02
France 3.22 2.42 10.61∗∗∗ 16.84∗∗∗
Germany 4.50 3.01 12.38∗∗∗ 18.98∗∗∗
Italy 5.86 5.13 21.6∗∗∗ 25.55∗∗∗
Japan 0.79 -0.71 -2.83 2.10
Norway 0.03 -0.86 -3.08 -1.20
U.K. 3.04 2.37 9.87∗∗∗ 16.9∗∗∗
U.S. 3.11 2.38 10.65∗∗∗ 14.08∗∗∗
World 3.72 2.89 12.36∗∗∗ 17.16∗∗∗
Table 7: Overlapping and non-overlapping quarterly and annual returns
This table replicates Table 2 using both non-overlapping and overlapping returns at quarterly and annual
frequencies. The GMM-corrected t-statistics are computed using the Newey and West (1987) procedure
with 2(h-1) lags, where h is the degree of overlap. The sample period is 1973 to 2007.
Non-overlapping Overlapping
b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%)
Panel A: Quarterly returns
Canada 0.04 0.82 0.86 0.50 -0.02 -0.46 -0.48 0.05
France 0.00 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.16 -2.47 -2.35 1.45
Germany 0.03 0.52 0.70 0.20 -0.14 -2.33 -2.82 1.30
Italy -0.05 -0.67 -0.74 0.33 -0.26 -3.58 -2.86 3.01
Japan 0.01 0.18 0.22 0.02 -0.10 -1.81 -1.74 0.78
Norway -0.06 -0.84 -1.21 0.53 -0.07 -0.87 -0.83 0.18
U.K. 0.00 0.08 0.12 0.00 -0.14 -2.36 -2.41 1.32
U.S. 0.01 0.12 0.15 0.01 -0.09 -1.93 -2.01 0.89
World 0.01 0.13 0.16 0.01 -0.11 -2.65 -2.69 1.67
Panel B: Annual returns
Canada 0.08 0.83 0.98 2.18 -0.05 -0.41 -0.28 0.04
France 0.09 0.56 0.56 1.01 -0.35 -2.39 -1.55 1.39
Germany 0.16 0.99 0.89 3.08 -0.12 -0.85 -1.02 0.18
Italy 0.19 1.11 1.16 3.85 -0.30 -1.79 -1.58 0.78
Japan -0.04 -0.32 -0.32 0.33 -0.24 -1.91 -1.69 0.90
Norway 0.10 0.49 0.54 0.78 -0.14 -0.77 -0.53 0.15
U.K. 0.15 1.37 1.15 5.73 -0.41 -3.39 -1.44 2.76
U.S. 0.07 0.72 0.56 1.65 -0.22 -2.34 -1.50 1.34
World 0.05 0.58 0.47 1.06 -0.24 -2.61 -1.68 1.66
Table 8: Predictive regressions using positive or negative oil price changes
The table shows the beta coefficient, the t-statistic under strict OLS assumptions, the GMM-corrected
t-statistic using Newey and West (1987) and the R2. The left panel considers positive oil price changes
only; the right panel considers negative oil price changes only. The sample period is 1973 to 2007.
∆o+t ∆o
−
t
b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%)
Canada 0.01 0.15 0.13 0.01 -0.09 -1.91 -2.94 0.87
France -0.12 -2.23 -2.03 1.18 -0.22 -3.81 -3.99 3.36
Germany -0.18 -3.43 -2.94 2.74 -0.21 -3.64 -3.78 3.09
Italy -0.15 -2.45 -2.41 1.41 -0.39 -5.91 -5.80 7.72
Japan -0.03 -0.60 -0.55 0.09 -0.12 -2.42 -2.49 1.38
Norway 0.01 0.21 0.17 0.01 -0.06 -0.83 -0.74 0.17
U.K. -0.15 -2.92 -3.09 2.01 -0.16 -2.85 -4.22 1.91
U.S. -0.09 -2.19 -2.04 1.14 -0.16 -3.72 -4.58 3.22
World -0.08 -2.17 -1.84 1.12 -0.17 -4.36 -6.12 4.35
Table 9: Predictive regressions using maximum and minimum measures of returns
The table shows the beta coefficient, the t-statistic under strict OLS assumptions, the GMM-corrected
t-statistic using Newey and West (1987) and the R2. The left panel shows positive price changes only,
the middle panel shows negative price changes only and the right panel shows both positive and negative
oil price changes as described in Eqs. (18), (20) and (21). The upper panel uses a horizon of 12 months to
calculate the maximum or minimum return whereas the lower panel uses 36 months. The sample period
is 1973 to 2007.
∆o†,+t ∆o
†,−
t ∆o
†,±
t
b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%)
Panel A: max/min returns using horizon k=12
Canada -0.03 -0.53 -0.59 0.07 -0.10 -1.33 -2.26 0.42 -0.06 -1.23 -1.74 0.36
France -0.10 -1.24 -1.27 0.36 -0.33 -3.66 -5.86 3.11 -0.18 -3.22 -3.01 2.43
Germany -0.14 -1.84 -1.86 0.81 -0.20 -2.27 -2.42 1.22 -0.15 -2.79 -3.15 1.84
Italy -0.07 -0.78 -0.99 0.14 -0.55 -5.48 -8.26 6.72 -0.26 -4.00 -2.67 3.70
Japan -0.06 -0.84 -0.67 0.17 -0.18 -2.35 -2.70 1.30 -0.10 -2.11 -1.61 1.05
Norway -0.13 -1.34 -1.81 0.43 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.07 -0.94 -0.84 0.21
U.K. -0.20 -2.69 -2.71 1.71 -0.20 -2.29 -4.66 1.25 -0.19 -3.43 -4.32 2.75
U.S. -0.10 -1.73 -2.12 0.71 -0.16 -2.45 -3.67 1.42 -0.12 -2.82 -4.29 1.88
World -0.09 -1.74 -1.55 0.72 -0.20 -3.34 -5.36 2.61 -0.13 -3.40 -3.68 2.69
Panel B: max/min returns using horizon k=36
Canada -0.05 -0.74 -0.88 0.13 -0.12 -1.51 -2.19 0.54 -0.08 -1.52 -2.28 0.55
France -0.10 -1.20 -1.23 0.34 -0.35 -3.62 -6.16 3.04 -0.20 -3.20 -2.99 2.40
Germany -0.12 -1.55 -1.61 0.57 -0.15 -1.65 -2.34 0.65 -0.13 -2.21 -2.68 1.16
Italy -0.05 -0.48 -0.61 0.06 -0.59 -5.44 -7.54 6.62 -0.26 -3.77 -2.37 3.30
Japan -0.04 -0.58 -0.46 0.08 -0.19 -2.25 -2.55 1.20 -0.10 -1.87 -1.36 0.83
Norway -0.17 -1.65 -2.61 0.65 0.05 0.39 0.46 0.04 -0.07 -0.98 -0.83 0.23
U.K. -0.19 -2.38 -2.33 1.35 -0.19 -2.03 -4.59 0.97 -0.18 -3.09 -3.75 2.23
U.S. -0.11 -1.77 -2.22 0.74 -0.18 -2.46 -3.20 1.43 -0.13 -2.90 -4.37 1.97
World -0.09 -1.57 -1.36 0.58 -0.20 -3.10 -4.98 2.26 -0.13 -3.16 -3.32 2.33
Table 10: Predictive regressions excluding the maximum and minimum measures
of returns
The table shows the beta coefficient, the t-statistic under strict OLS assumptions, the GMM-corrected
t-statistic using Newey and West (1987) and the R2. The left panel shows positive price changes only,
the middle panel shows negative price changes only and the right panel shows both positive and negative
oil price changes, i.e. the three headers correspond to using the oil price measures in Eqs. (22) to (24)
as the predictor. The upper panel uses a horizon of 12 months to calculate the maximum or minimum
return whereas the lower panel uses 36 months. The sample period is 1973 to 2007.
∆o˜†,+t ∆o˜
†,−
t ∆o˜
†,±
t
b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%)
Panel A: max/min returns using horizon k=12
Canada 0.002 1.00 1.08 0.24 -0.001 -0.63 -0.47 0.09 0.000 0.33 0.29 0.03
France -0.001 -0.54 -0.57 0.07 0.004 2.03 1.66 0.98 0.002 1.13 0.97 0.31
Germany -0.002 -1.26 -1.34 0.38 0.003 1.54 1.45 0.56 0.000 0.17 0.16 0.01
Italy 0.001 0.23 0.29 0.01 0.005 1.95 1.37 0.90 0.003 1.71 1.59 0.69
Japan -0.002 -1.40 -1.60 0.47 0.000 -0.21 -0.20 0.01 -0.002 -1.30 -1.45 0.40
Norway 0.001 0.30 0.24 0.02 0.001 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.001 0.38 0.33 0.04
U.K. -0.003 -1.79 -2.18 0.76 0.004 1.75 1.99 0.73 0.000 -0.09 -0.09 0.00
U.S. -0.001 -0.74 -0.89 0.13 0.001 0.92 0.90 0.20 0.000 0.11 0.11 0.00
World -0.001 -1.05 -1.26 0.26 0.002 1.23 1.07 0.36 0.000 0.10 0.10 0.00
Panel B: max/min returns using horizon k=36
Canada 0.001 0.27 0.30 0.02 0.003 1.27 1.23 0.38 0.002 1.06 1.09 0.27
France -0.001 -0.62 -0.75 0.09 0.008 2.88 2.35 1.95 0.003 1.37 1.26 0.45
Germany -0.004 -1.56 -2.08 0.58 0.003 1.09 1.08 0.29 -0.001 -0.57 -0.63 0.08
Italy 0.002 0.57 0.71 0.08 0.013 4.00 3.24 3.70 0.007 3.09 3.00 2.23
Japan -0.003 -1.27 -1.38 0.38 0.003 0.96 1.05 0.22 -0.001 -0.41 -0.44 0.04
Norway -0.001 -0.49 -0.40 0.06 0.001 0.20 0.18 0.01 -0.001 -0.27 -0.23 0.02
U.K. -0.004 -1.88 -2.05 0.84 0.004 1.32 1.78 0.42 -0.001 -0.67 -0.71 0.11
U.S. -0.002 -0.93 -1.18 0.20 0.003 1.56 1.81 0.58 0.000 0.26 0.29 0.02
World -0.002 -1.12 -1.40 0.30 0.004 1.86 1.89 0.82 0.000 0.29 0.31 0.02
Table 11: Predictive regressions using oil price changes scaled with GARCH volatil-
ity
The table shows the beta coefficient, the t-statistic under strict OLS assumptions, the GMM-corrected
t-statistic using Newey and West (1987) and the R2. The left panel is the change in oil price scaled by the
GARCH volatility as in Eq. (28); the middle panel considers positive changes only and the right panel
considers negative changes only, as described in Eqs. (29) and (30). The sample period is 1973 to 2007.
∆o‡t ∆o
‡,+
t ∆o
‡,−
t
b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%) b tOLS tNW R
2(%)
Canada -0.001 -0.67 -0.62 0.11 -0.001 -0.30 -0.23 0.02 -0.003 -0.88 -1.13 0.19
France -0.007 -3.18 -2.84 2.37 -0.009 -2.69 -2.47 1.70 -0.011 -2.46 -2.45 1.43
Germany -0.009 -4.38 -4.09 4.39 -0.012 -3.86 -3.59 3.46 -0.013 -3.13 -3.34 2.30
Italy -0.009 -3.58 -3.21 2.99 -0.008 -2.05 -1.98 0.99 -0.020 -4.10 -3.72 3.88
Japan -0.003 -1.33 -1.27 0.42 -0.005 -1.74 -1.70 0.72 -0.001 -0.22 -0.25 0.01
Norway -0.001 -0.39 -0.34 0.04 0.002 0.51 0.41 0.06 -0.008 -1.43 -1.44 0.49
U.K. -0.007 -3.15 -3.46 2.33 -0.009 -2.86 -3.07 1.93 -0.009 -2.18 -2.57 1.12
U.S. -0.006 -3.55 -3.64 2.93 -0.007 -2.89 -2.67 1.96 -0.009 -2.87 -3.23 1.94
World -0.006 -3.69 -3.16 3.17 -0.007 -3.18 -2.47 2.37 -0.008 -2.76 -3.07 1.79
Table 12: Tests for non-linearity and asymmetry
The table shows p-values for various Wald tests. Panel A reports p-values corresponding to the null
hypothesis that the coefficient on the variable in each column is zero, when included as an additional
regressor. The columns correspond to the maximum measures (Eqs. (18), (20) and (21)) and scaled
measures (Eqs. (28) to (30)) respectively. Panel B reports p-values corresponding to the null hypothesis
that the coefficient on positive and negative changes are identical. The columns correspond to tests for
equality of the coefficients on Eqs. (16) and (17), Eqs. (18) and (20), and Eqs. (29) and (30) respectively.
All F-statistics have been GMM-corrected using Newey and West (1987). P-values less than 0.1 are in
bold. The sample period is 1973 to 2007.
Panel A: Wald test for significance of coefficients
∆o†,+t ∆o
†,−
t ∆o
†,±
t ∆o
‡
t ∆o
‡,+
t ∆o
‡,−
t
Canada 0.99 0.13 0.29 0.81 0.73 0.76
France 0.42 0.00 0.36 0.82 0.82 0.99
Germany 0.59 0.74 0.80 0.22 0.27 0.77
Italy 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.44 0.22 0.24
Japan 0.93 0.07 0.43 0.83 0.50 0.11
Norway 0.07 0.78 0.28 0.87 0.42 0.08
U.K. 0.38 0.16 0.14 0.66 0.54 0.73
U.S. 0.81 0.20 0.57 0.29 0.59 0.48
World 0.72 0.01 0.43 0.53 0.62 0.85
Panel B: Wald test for equality of coefficients
∆ot ∆o
†
t ∆o
‡
t
Canada 0.09 0.38 0.64
France 0.14 0.02 0.91
Germany 0.77 0.62 0.84
Italy 0.01 0.00 0.06
Japan 0.18 0.26 0.18
Norway 0.45 0.26 0.13
U.K. 0.96 0.91 0.76
U.S. 0.19 0.37 0.79
World 0.08 0.13 0.98
Figure 1: Oil prices and important oil events
The figure plots the nominal and real WTI oil price. The nominal price is the solid line and the real price is the dotted line. The vertical bars
mark important events that impacted the oil price.
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Figure 2: Recursive beta coefficients in the U.S.
The figure plots the recursively estimated beta coefficient on lagged oil price changes in the predictive univariate regression. The upper panel
shows important oil dates marked as vertical bars whereas the lower panel shows NBER recession dates as vertical bars.
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Figure 3: International recursive beta coefficients
The figure plots the recursively estimated beta coefficients on lagged oil price changes in the predictive univariate regressions. The vertical bars
mark important oil dates.
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Figure 4: Cumulative sum of squared errors graphs in the U.S.
The figure plots the cumulative difference in the sum of squared errors between the prevailing mean and a predictive regression for the U.S.
When the graph is increasing, the OLS model predicts better than a random walk.
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Figure 5: International cumulative sum of squared errors graphs
The figure plots the cumulative difference in the sum of squared errors between the prevailing mean and a predictive regression for the remaining
countries in the sample. When the graph is increasing, the OLS model predicts better than a random walk.
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Figure 6: Cumulative sum of squared errors graphs after removing ”oil dates”
The figure plots the cumulative difference in the sum of squared errors between the prevailing mean and a predictive regression. In this figure
the events identified in Section 2 have been removed from the sample. The x axis now corresponds to observation number after the removal.
When the graph is increasing, the OLS model predicts better than a random walk.
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Figure 7: Max oil price increases and decreases
The figure plots the oil price measures corresponding to the max and min change in the oil price over a period of 12 and 36 months as described
in Eqs. (18) and (20). The vertical bars mark the important oil dates.
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